Is the “Chinese ideology” the source of the problem? Why China will continue to take a hardline stance toward its neighbors
What is the historical lineage of China’s seizure of power by force?
The Qing dynasty was established in 1616. At that time, the country was called Jin. It was not a country of Han Chinese, but rather a country that rose up in northeastern China after the unification of the Tungusic Manchurian tribe by the Nuruhachi.
In 1636, the second generation took the country’s name, Qing. The Ming Dynasty fell in the rebellion of Li Zicheng, and in the process of putting down the rebellion, the third generation moved the capital to Beijing in 1644 and completed the unification of all of China in 1681.
The heyday of the Qing dynasty was in the mid-1700s, during the reign of the sixth Qing emperor, Qianlong. His territory expanded to its largest scale, including Mongolia, the region that is later called the Uyghur autonomous region, and Tibet. The population exploded during this period, reaching 140 million in 1741, 200 million in 1762, and 300 million in 1790. Of course, at that time, the Qing was the most populous country in the world.
Subsequently, China was economically and militarily inferior in comparison to the Western powers, backed by the Industrial Revolution. After its defeat in the Opium War of 1840, among other things, it was forced to start on the road to opening up the country. When the economically weak opened the country, the domestic economy was devastated. As a result, a popular uprising ensued.
The silver holdings of the Qing dynasty began to plummet at the end of the eighteenth century due to the suppression of the White Lotus Rebellion, and the outflow of silver from the country began in the mid-nineteenth century. Then, with the Opium War and the Taiping Heaven Rebellion (1851), it was reduced to almost nothing.
At the height of the Qing dynasty (1661-1795), from the fourth Kangxi emperor to the sixth Qianlong emperor, spending was stable, but it doubled during the reign of the Xiangfeng emperor after the Opium War, and doubled again after the Sino-Japanese War (1895) and the reparations after the Yiheidan Rebellion (1900).
As a result, the finances of the Qing Empire, which had been largely in the black until the 19th century, turned into a deficit after the Sino-Japanese War, and just before the fall of the Qing dynasty, the Qing dynasty fell into a deficit (equivalent to total expenditures during the stable period).
The Qing dynasty was replaced by the Republic of China in the Xinhai Revolution; the establishment of the Republic of China was proclaimed by Sun Yat-sen in Nanjing in 1912; although the Kuomintang won an overwhelming victory in the 1913 parliamentary elections, after the outlawing of the Kuomintang by President Yuan Shikai, the conversion of the Kuomintang to an imperial government by Yuan Shikai, and the abolition of Yuan Shikai’s imperial regime and his death in 1916, the Qing dynasty China entered an era of warlords.
Eventually, after World War II, the weakening of Japanese control of the country led to a struggle between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, which was temporarily in the hands of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Communist Party (the Nationalist Civil War).
The initially dominant Kuomintang became outnumbered as it lost the support of the peasantry, and in 1949 Mao Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.
Like the previous dynasties, China today has seized power by force while the previous government was weakened by the loss of popular support.
China, which must devote its power to the governance of a large country
China is also unique in its mentality. Chinese ideology (inward thinking), misuse of Chinese classics, and the harmful effects of tyrannical orientation are likely to appear.
Xi Jinping has renounced his peaceful rise to prominence and strengthened his golden (bills) diplomacy and his hardline territorial claims through the formulation of the nine-dash line.
As a result, neighboring countries have united in increasing their vigilance against China. The United States has also strengthened its hardline stance, due in part to the birth of President Trump. Even Japan has tended to increase its military spending and is promoting the possession of a de facto aircraft carrier.
The rival stances of India, Vietnam, and Australia are particularly pronounced, and pro-China leaders in the Asia-Pacific region have become unelectable. This is probably because their money-grubbing diplomacy has been described as debt-addled diplomacy, and as a result, it has been revealed that it has not served their country well.
The American historian Edward Lutwak describes it as a “paradoxical theory” that China’s rise to power, rather than its peacefulness, has weakened its position.
Even now, China has not been able to change its hardline stance toward its neighbors. Some people believe that the original national stance of “Chinese ideology” and the size of the country are hindering it.
As long as the Heavenly Son of China is the center of the world and has to devote all his energies to governing a large country, he will not pay much attention to the outside world. And with the economy on a downward slope, it is hard to get rid of the hard-line foreign policy of diverting discontent to the outside world.
Why China’s economic statistics can be ‘disguised’
Edward Lutwak has a lot to say about the misuse of the Chinese classics, especially “Sun Tzu”.
He says that China has created an “excessive belief in trickery and surprise attacks through deception” as foreign countries think of things in a “common identity” with them and that “unresolved disputes can be resolved by deliberately stirring up a crisis”.
China’s actions based on the misuse of the Chinese classics unite neighboring countries. The discrepancy between the way things are viewed and the “Western black and white” strategy, especially in the United States, is astonishingly large. If it is interpreted by the United States with hostility, it can lead to a major conflict.
Historically, tyrannical rule has been the norm in China, and a system of collective leadership with Mao’s Cultural Revolution as a counterpoint is the exception.
In addition, there is a very strong suspicion that China’s economic statistics are falsified. Originally, the Soviet Union Embassy was the command post for China’s economic reforms since 1949, and the method of calculating the statistics was guided by the Soviet Union. China, like the Soviet Union, has established a centralized statistical organization, and since the National Bureau of Statistics of China now has centralized control of the various statistics, it is easy to falsify them.
‘GDP growth rates have fluctuated too little,’ ‘the timing of GDP publication is too early,’ ‘trade statistics and GDP are inconsistent,’ and ‘high or low GDP has been linked to a rise in popularity.’
In light of this, it is highly likely that China’s economic statistics have been tampered with in some way.
It is only in the form of despotism and state capitalism that even the statistics used to derive the right economic policies are used to inspire the people. The device by which wrong policies are corrected does not work properly in a tyrannical system of rule.